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Abstract 
 This article critically analyses the use of the persistent objector 
doctrine in unilaterally challenging the validity of Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) rights and the related 
state obligations. The persistent objector doctrine gives effect to 
state sovereignty and provides a mechanism through which 
states can object to a customary norm preventing the objecting 
state from incurring any legal obligations once the norm has 
emerged. The aim of this article is to reflect on whether the 
persistent objector doctrine could legitimately be used to negate 
state obligations that would naturally follow from the 
crystallisation of customary norms in the area of SOGI rights. In 
this sense the article is both concerned with analysing (not 
concluding on) current state practice in terms of understanding 
if and how the persistent objector doctrine is applied, and with 
gazing forward in terms of analysing whether, if customary law 
emerges to protect SOGI rights, the persistent objector doctrine 
could in fact be applied to limit or comprehensively shield states 
from SOGI-related obligations. This analysis takes place within 
the framework of the UNHRC Resolution 32/2, which creates an 
Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and 
Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 
and of the responses of the seven African states that provided 
statements before the UNHRC in the process leading up to this 
resolution. 
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1 Introduction 
This article critically analyses the use of the persistent objector doctrine in 
unilaterally challenging the validity of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity1 (SOGI) rights and related state obligations. The persistent objector 
doctrine provides a mechanism through which states can object to a 
customary norm, and it prevents the objecting state from incurring any legal 
obligations once the norm has emerged. The persistent objector doctrine 
gives effect to state sovereignty, and must be invoked at the inception of a 
specific state practice. As Voss points out, "persistent objection or support 
(eventually) impacts the strengthening or decaying of SOGI rights in 
international law".2 However, as argued in this article, the inability of the 
persistent objector doctrine to account for the universality3 of human rights 
law, a principle on which human rights law is founded, limits the influence 
of this mechanism on SOGI rights. 
State practice, recognising SOGI rights in accordance with the Yogyakarta 
Principles plus 10,4 for example, is currently increasing, as substantiated in 
this article, but the state practice of recognising SOGI rights is not yet 
constant and uniform, and there is undoubtedly state practice that 
contradicts this development. However, it is not the objective of this article 
to conclude on whether or not customary international law has developed 
to protect SOGI rights. That issue has been addressed by other authors with 
different results.5 It is rather to reflect on whether the persistent objector 
doctrine could legitimately be used to negate state obligations that would 
naturally follow from the crystallisation of customary norms in the area of 
SOGI rights. In this sense the article is both concerned with analysing (not 
                                            
* Annika Rudman. Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa, LLB LLM (Lund) PhD (Gothenburg). E-mail: 
arudman@sun.ac.za. 
1  This article acknowledges that in the term SOGI, the SO and GI concepts are neither 
mutually exclusive nor mostly overlapping. They are distinct concepts that may or may 
not intersect. However, for the purpose of this article, the SOGI rights concept will be 
viewed as one concept albeit with a multifaceted application. It is also important to 
note that the SOGI concept, as it is used in this article, does not include gender 
expression, as Resolution 32/2 does not include "expression" in its terminology.  
2  Voss 2018 Hum Rts Rev 4. 
3  As further defined under 3. 
4  International Commission of Jurists Yogyakarta Principles – Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (2007); and Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10 Additional Principles and 
State Obligations on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to 
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to 
Complement the Yogyakarta Principles (2017). 
5  Clavier 2016 Fordham Int'l LJ 613-668; McGoldrick 2016 Hum Rts L Rev 613-668. 
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concluding on) current state practice in terms of understanding if and how 
the persistent objector doctrine is applied, and forward gazing in terms of 
analysing whether the persistent objector doctrine could in fact be applied if 
customary law emerges to protect SOGI rights, to limit or comprehensively 
shield states from SOGI-related obligations. 
In June 2016 the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) took an 
important step towards protecting individuals against discrimination based 
on SOGI by passing Resolution 32/2 titled: Protection against Violence and 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
(Resolution 32/2).6 It established for the first time a mechanism overseeing 
the implementation of SOGI rights: An Independent Expert on Protection 
against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (hereafter the Independent Expert on SOGI rights). 
Resolution 32/2 importantly reiterated the universality of all human rights 
and reaffirmed that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights".7 
Resolution 32/2, and the proceedings leading up to its establishment, 
provide a relevant framework within which an analysis of the value of the 
persistent objector doctrine can take place. It offers a limited scope within 
which it is possible to reflect on the reaction of states to the diverse state 
practice that is currently shaping the protection, or non-protection, of SOGI 
rights under international human rights law in support of or contrary to the 
principle of the universality of human rights law. The scope is further limited 
to the seven African states that provided statements before the UNHRC in 
the process leading up to Resolution 32/2. 
It is important to note from the outset the different views on the meaning of 
the "universality" of human rights law (further discussed under 3) that 
dominated the discussion at the UNHRC. On the one hand, states not 
accepting SOGI rights often, as is evident from the discussion under 5, 
define "universal" as an account of unanimous state practice - in this context 
the practice of not viewing SOGI rights as human rights. From this 
perspective universality is garnered from states' actions and, importantly, is 
controlled by the same. Viewing universality from this perspective, SOGI 
rights become an expansion of human rights law and states that are 
                                            
6  Protection against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity HRC Res 32/02, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/2 (2016). 
7  Protection against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity HRC Res 32/02, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/2 (2016) para 1. 
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unwilling to protect SOGI rights often deny this perceived development of 
the law based on cultural/religious grounds. 
On the other hand, states accepting SOGI rights often refer to "universal" 
as the application of existing rights, such as the right to liberty and security 
of the person, to all human beings. This means that these rights are 
universal in their application to all human beings including lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons. From this perspective 
universality cannot be garnered from states' practice alone and is 
importantly no longer controlled solely by state practice. This is what Lau 
refers to as the human rights regime's "universalist assumption" (further 
discussed under 4).8 This assumption is visible for example in article 2 of 
the UDHR,9 which refers to "[e]veryone" as entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the UDHR "without distinction of any kind". 
When evaluating the position of SOGI rights under international law, it is 
important to acknowledge that neither international nor regional human 
rights law contains a direct reference to SOGI rights in the same manner for 
example as the CEDAW10 (protecting women against gender 
discrimination), or the CERD11 (protecting against racial discrimination). 
Therefore customary international law becomes relevant because as long 
as there is no direct reference to sexual orientation and gender identity in 
international treaty law the "universalist assumption", as echoed for 
example in the UDHR, ICCPR12 and ICESCR,13 can be interpreted by state 
practice as inclusive or exclusive. The development and expression of 
customary international law becomes relevant, as once a norm of customary 
international law has developed, it binds all states except persistent 
objectors. 
This article is divided into six parts. Part 2 contextualises the use of the 
persistent objector doctrine within the context of emerging SOGI rights 
under customary international law. Part 3 provides a discussion on the 
different meanings of "universality". Part 4 provides a brief background to 
the persistent objector doctrine, its mechanics, its functional purposes, and 
its applicability to international human rights law. Part 5 explores the 
                                            
8  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 501. 
9  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR). 
10  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 
(CEDAW). 
11  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965) (CERD). 
12  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR). 
13  International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR). 
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responses of seven African states to Resolution 32/2 to highlight the 
practical use of the persistent objector doctrine and arguments centred on 
"universality". Part 6, the concluding part, argues that the persistent objector 
doctrine would have no application to SOGI rights under customary 
international law once crystallised, and suggests how human rights courts 
could approach the application of the persistent objector doctrine in this 
regard. 
2 Customary international law, sexual orientation, gender 
identity and the persistent objector doctrine 
The process of establishing customary international law is difficult to 
delineate and customary norms are therefore often challenged. Dressed in 
language such as "ripeness" and "maturity", referring to state "practice" and 
"beliefs", customary international law has mostly been abandoned by states 
as their preferred source of law governing their relationships with one 
another.14 This is particularly true within the domain of international human 
rights law, where the world has witnessed a proliferation of treaties in the 
last 60 years.15 However, in the absence of treaty law the "constant" and 
"uniform" practice referred to by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
the Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru)16 becomes important, alongside any 
permissible defence against such practice, such as the persistent objector 
doctrine.17 
Currently, an increasing number of states18 is arguably directed in their 
actions by an acceptance of SOGI as a prohibited ground without a direct 
reference to SOGI in the ICCPR or the ICESCR, for example. The indication 
                                            
14  Loschin 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L Pol'y 148. 
15  Loschin 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L Pol'y 148. 
16  Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266 (hereafter the Asylum Case). 
17  Both constant and uniform usage and the persistent objector are discussed in this 
case. 
18  ILGA 2016 https://ilga.org/downloads/summary_SOGIESCatUPR_report.pdf; Arc 
International 2016 http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/human-rights-
council/32nd-session-of-the-human-rights-council/appointing-an-independent-expert-
on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-an-analysis-of-process-results-and-
implications/ii-the-process-leading-up-to-the-resolution-2016/. Referring to the over 
one hundred States from all regions of the world that have made voluntary 
commitments to address violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity in the context of the Universal Periodic Review. More than two thirds 
of all States that received such recommendations accepted at least one (and often 
several) such recommendations, indicating that a majority of States welcomes 
constructive dialogue and has made express commitment to addressing these human 
rights concerns. Also referred to by the Dutch representative to the UNHRC: ILGA 
2016 https://ilga.org/compilation-adoption-2016-sogi-resolution para 3.2.6 statement 
by the Netherlands, Mr. Roderick Van Schreven – 00:33:41. 
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that states increasingly view SOGI rights as protected under international 
and regional human rights law can, on the one hand, be explained by states' 
preference for a teleological interpretation of the ICCPR, for example, as 
provided for under article 31 of the VCLT.19 In this regard the direction 
referred to above draws on the "object and purpose" of the ICCPR, which 
arguably confirms the universality in application of all human rights. This is 
established, for example, by the reference in the preamble to the ICCPR to 
the "inherent dignity of the human person". On the other hand, the direction 
referred to above can equally be viewed as state practice, inspired by a 
purposeful interpretation of article 2(1) of the ICCPR, for example.20 
It is a well-established fact under international law that treaty provisions and 
states' interpretations of their obligations under such provisions may inspire 
customary international law to develop in a certain direction. As the ICJ 
concluded in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America),21 even if treaty 
provisions and customary law deal with the same subject matter (in this 
case the general prohibition of discrimination), customary international law 
exists independently of treaty law.22 
Importantly, as expressed in article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, when interpreting 
a treaty "[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties" should be taken into account, together with the context 
of the specific treaty. As suggested by Sands, article 31(3)(c) is "available 
to assist in resolving … conflicts between treaty and custom".23 It is possible 
to consider a scenario where the protection of SOGI rights would develop 
under customary international law to assist a court in interpreting a non-
discrimination clause in a human rights treaty. It is also possible to imagine 
a scenario where a court, based on state practice alone, could directly apply 
SOGI protection under customary international law. As expressed in the 
introduction, the aim of this article is not to pronounce on whether customary 
international law has developed to protect SOGI rights per se but rather to 
                                            
19  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT). 
20  Which reads: "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status [emphasis added]". See for example Toonen v Australia 
UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) 8.7 (hereafter the Toonen case). 
21  Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (hereafter the Nicaragua 
case). 
22  Nicaragua case paras 172-178. 
23  Sands 2014 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 88. 
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identify the importance of customary international law in developing SOGI 
rights, and from this vantage point to analyse the effect of unilateral 
statements by states in detracting from the basic principle of the universality 
of human rights. 
Under international law a state's only defence against a legal obligation 
contained under a norm of customary international law is its persistent 
objection to such a norm. According to Lau the persistent objector, in line 
with this doctrine, is exempt from the norm after it becomes law, "so long as 
the state can rebut the assumption that it acquiesced to the norm and prove 
that, instead, it exercised clear and consistent objections throughout the 
norm's emergence".24 The persistent objection to a principle serves a two-
fold purpose from the perspective of the objector: it may impede the 
development of the principle as it may alter other states' behaviour, and as 
expressed by Stein, in the final instance it permits an individual state to "opt 
out of new and otherwise universal rules of international law".25 
However, as argued in this article, in the context of human rights, more 
specifically SOGI rights, the application of the persistent objector doctrine 
creates contradictory results that do not align with the universal purpose and 
objective of international human rights law.26 As Lau points out, and as 
referred to in the introduction, "[t]he human rights regime's universalist 
assumption is at odds with the effects of the persistent objector doctrine".27 
If states are allowed to exempt themselves from international human rights 
norms, the universal nature of human rights law is automatically 
compromised.28 Therefore, the persistent objector doctrine may very well 
be compatible with other areas of international law, but not with universal 
human rights law, as further explored under 4. 
                                            
24  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 498. 
25  Stein 1985 Harv Int'l LJ 457. 
26  The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has taken the view that a reservation to the 
obligation contained in Art 2 of the ICCPR to respect and ensure the rights, and to do 
so on a non-discriminatory basis, would be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Covenant. See Human Rights Committee General Comment No 24: Issues Relating 
to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant on 
Reservations CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.6 (1994) para 9. 
27  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 501. 
28  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 501. 
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3 Sexual orientation and gender identity rights and the 
battle over what is "universal" 
The modern origin of the universal characteristic of human rights law is 
found in the UDHR, where it is stipulated that "[a]ll human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights" and that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in [the UDHR], without distinction of any kind". 
The concept of universality is furthermore well described in article 5 of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna Declaration),29 
confirming that: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
religious and cultural backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is a duty of States 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
As is evident in both declarations, the universality principle is closely related 
to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, which are not mutually 
exclusive. As a basic principle, universality does not consider differences 
but simply humanity. Therefore, human rights shall have universal 
application to all. Universality is a concept that Arendt aptly describes as a 
"right to have rights".30 The discrimination and equality aspects of human 
rights have been added to further accentuate the principle of universality. 
Therefore, human rights shall have universal and equal application to all. 
This has worked well in terms of highlighting groups of persons in need of 
specific protection, but has also added a layer of ambiguity, as only certain 
differences seemingly give rise to protection. This is certainly not in line with 
the universality principle itself. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) has eloquently described the relationship between universality 
and non-discrimination, emphasising that: 
The notion of equality springs directly from the oneness of the human family 
and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual … [i]t is impermissible to 
subject human beings to differences in treatment that are inconsistent with 
their unique and congenerous character.31 
                                            
29  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993). 
30  Arendt Origins of Totalitarianism 293-294. 
31  Advisory Opinion on Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica OC-(1984) 4/84 IACrtHR para 55. 
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Therefore, universality, or the right of everyone to have rights, as expressed 
by Arendt,32 is a prerequisite to dignity, which embraces all fundamental 
human rights. 
In the context of SOGI rights the use of the term "universal" can best be 
described as a slippery slope; where the extra-cultural nature of human 
rights law, that is, its applicability to all regardless of cultural or religious 
affiliations or beliefs, is often conflated or replaced by a (mistaken33) 
requirement of the universal acceptance of SOGI rights. During the voting 
session at the UNHRC, the representative of the Nigerian delegation, as 
further discussed under 5, articulated this conflation when he stated that 
"sexual orientation and gender identity still do not enjoy universal popularity 
and acceptability to qualify for a human rights issue … the vast majority of 
nations have not accepted LGBT rights".34 However, as argued in this 
article, "universal" signifies that all human rights are attached to all human 
beings, not accepted by all states at all times. The definition of "universal" 
in the UDHR means it is not conditional on a widespread acceptance – it is 
a pre-condition upon which the human rights law regime rests. As such, the 
core value of the UDHR, for the purpose of the discussion in this article, 
does not primarily lie in the rights set out, or the non-discrimination clause 
presented, but in its "universal" application. 
The question about the universality of human rights is furthermore intimately 
linked with the question of which source would create "universality" in 
application. Arguably, as put forward by D'Amato, customary international 
law is the only universal international law – as once it has matured, it binds 
all.35 The primary question then becomes whether there is enough evidence 
to conclude that the concept of the "universality" of human rights, as defined 
above, has emerged as a general principle of international law as referred 
                                            
32  Rudman 2015 AHRLJ 6. 
33  This can be contrasted with the test for customary international law, where, even 
though the word "universal" often features in the statements of states, there is no need 
for a practice to actually be "universal". As stipulated by the Special Rapporteur to the 
International Law Commission on the identification of customary international law, "for 
a rule of general customary international law to emerge or be identified the practice 
need not be unanimous (universal); but, it must be 'extensive' or, in other words, 
sufficiently widespread". International Law Commission Second Report on 
Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur 
Sixty-sixth Session Geneva (5 May-6 June, 7 July-8 August 2014). Also see North 
Sea Continental Shelf [1969] ICJ Rep 3 para 104 (Separate Opinion of Ammoun J) 
and para 229 (Dissenting Opinion of Lachs J) and generally para 74. 
34  ILGA 2016 https://ilga.org/compilation-adoption-2016-sogi-resolution para 2.10 
Nigeria, Mr Peters Omologbe Emuze – 00:12:55. 
35  D'Amato 2010 https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers 
/116/ 2. 
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to in article 38(b) of the Statute of the ICJ. If it is accepted that at least part36 
of the rights set out in the UDHR have become firmly established as 
customary international law, the basic principle on which they exist must 
arguably at the very least be afforded the same status. If this argument is 
reflected against the discussion in the first report of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) on jus cogens by the Special Rapporteur on this topic, 
indicating that the prohibition of torture, slavery, genocide and non-
discrimination have been universally identified as not only part of customary 
international law but also as jus cogens norms,37 it would arguably lead to 
the conclusion that the international community has not only accepted that 
these rights have gained a sufficiently widespread acceptance (and that 
there is no valid defence against a violation of these rights), but that the 
principle underlying these rights – the principle of universality in application 
– has, at the very minimum, been accepted as a norm under customary 
international law. 
As an example, Yasseen suggested as early as in 1966 that "the concept 
of jus cogens in international law [is] unchallengeable and … [n]o specialist 
in international law could contest the proposition that no two States could 
come to an agreement to institute slavery".38 As suggested in this article, it 
follows as a logical outcome of this understanding of the jus cogens nature 
of slavery that it would be incomprehensible, under international law, to 
justify the enslavement of a particular human being based on any ground; 
that is, the prohibition of slavery is based on its universal application to all 
human beings. If this conclusion is accepted, it remains to be explored 
whether the persistent objector doctrine can act as a valid defence against 
any human rights norm. 
                                            
36  For further discussion on what rights qualify as part of customary law and particularly 
the position of socio-economic rights, see for example Von Bernstorff 2008 EJIL 913 
and Hannum 1996 Ga J Int'l & Comp L 289. 
37  First Report on Jus Cogens by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur International Law 
Commission Sixty-eighth Session, Geneva (2 May-10 June, 4 July-12 August 2016) 
A/CN.4/693. It is important to acknowledge that this report did not conclude on any 
norms of jus cogens nature but discussed at length the possible principle that they 
could be viewed as having achieved this status.  
38  Summary Record of the 828th Meeting, Yearbook …1966, vol. I (Part I), para 26, at p 
38. Cited in First Report on Jus Cogens by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur International 
Law Commission Sixty-eighth Session, Geneva (2 May-10 June, 4 July-12 August 
2016) A/CN.4/693 para 32. 
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4 The persistent objector doctrine 
4.1 The mechanics of the persistent objector doctrine 
Until the early 1960s there was no real support for the persistent objector 
doctrine, as the international community from 1945 onwards consisted of a 
fairly homogenous set of states, dominated by the power of a handful of 
central powers. The 1960s and 70s saw the dawn of new African, Asian and 
Latin-American states through the process of de-colonialisation. The 
emergence of these new states together with the rise in influence of the 
Eastern European bloc radically changed the power balance in the 
international community and upset, as indicated by Weil, the "delicate, 
indeed, precarious, equilibrium"39 needed to formulate customary 
international law. As Western states felt that they were losing control over 
the formulation of customary international law, led by the United States (US) 
they introduced the persistent objector doctrine as a response to the 
fragmentation of customary international law.40 
As mentioned in the introduction, when a legal norm has crystallised into 
customary international law it is automatically binding on all states. No state 
can opt out unilaterally.41 As Schachter explains, if a state were to be 
allowed to opt out of customary international law based on its own interests, 
this would amount to a complete denial of the very existence of customary 
international law.42 When this is combined with the aspect of the universal 
application of human rights law, this problem is superimposed. 
The formation of customary international law requires that a critical mass of 
states recognise the norm as compelling law and act on it as such. 
Customary international law develops over time and it is during the time 
when the norm is gradually emerging that the persistent objector doctrine 
may become relevant. Stein indicates that the persistent objector doctrine 
will find progressively more expression in modern international law because 
of the rapid formulation of customary international law.43 Already in 1985 he 
provided the analysis that the modus operandi of classic international law 
was to answer the question of what states should have done by asking what 
they have done.44 In modern international law, as pointed out by Loschin, 
"the modern process is prospective: multilateral conventions are written with 
                                            
39  Weil 1983 AJIL 433-434. 
40  American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Third ch 1. 
41  Akehurst 1974-1975 British Ybk Intl L 24-26. 
42  Schachter International Law in Theory and Practice 38. 
43  Stein 1985 Harv Int'l LJ 457. 
44  Stein 1985 Harv Int'l LJ 465. 
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a view to what states should do now and in the future".45 Therefore, the strict 
examination of state practice has lost its primacy in the methodology of 
international law and has begun to wither. As succinctly pointed out by 
Stein: 
Correspondingly, opinio juris is no longer seen as a consciousness that 
matures slowly over time (and finally imparts obligatory force to a practice 
once motivated by habit, convenience, or moral sentiment), but instead as a 
conviction that instantaneously attaches to a rule believed to be socially 
necessary or desirable.46 
In basic terms, the persistent objector doctrine operates under five main 
conditions. Firstly, the state must start objecting to the rule as the rule 
emerges – and it must continue to do so. The objection can take different 
forms and take place in different forums. As explained by Dumberry, an 
objection can include: 
[S]tatements made during treaty negotiations, pleadings before national and 
international tribunals, voting and statements at international conferences, 
diplomatic communications, the promulgation of national laws, statements and 
reservations made when signing/ratifying treaties, etc.47 
Secondly, there must be clear evidence of the objection. Thirdly, the 
objecting state must refute any assumption of acceptance of the rule. 
Fourthly, silence or failure on behalf of the objecting state is interpreted as 
acceptance. Finally, objections must be consistent over time and the state 
must invoke its objection whenever it is relevant.48 
However, as concluded by Lau, even though these are the conditions for a 
successful application of the persistent objector doctrine, the definition of an 
"objection" and the "consistency" thereof are unsettled issues under 
international law.49 There are less than a handful of cases where 
international forums have dealt with these issues. In the frequently cited 
Asylum Case and Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v 
Norway)50 the issue of the persistent objector doctrine was dealt with obiter 
and both cases were decided on a different ground, giving little guidance as 
to the definitions related to the persistent objector doctrine. These cases are 
                                            
45  Loschin 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L Pol'y 149. 
46  Stein 1985 Harv Int'l LJ 465. 
47  Dumberry 2010 ICLQ 781. 
48  Loschin 1996 UC Davis J Int'l L Pol'y 149; Colson 1986 Wash L Rev 965968. 
49  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 498. 
50  Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116 
(hereafter the Fisheries Case). 
A RUDMAN  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  13 
also less relevant in the context of international human rights law, as they 
did not feature any human rights norms.51 
In the only available human rights case, Michael Domingues v United 
States,52 the Inter-American Commission (IACom) gave the application of 
the persistent objector doctrine a nod of approval. In this case the US raised 
the persistent objector doctrine as a defence against allegations that its use 
of the juvenile death penalty violated customary international law. In the 
end, the IACom asserted that the persistent objector doctrine was an 
ineffective defence to the use of the death penalty for juveniles per se, as 
this norm had reached the status of jus cogens.53 However, it confirmed that 
in its opinion the persistent objector doctrine may be raised as a defence 
against the application of a human rights norm. It is important to point out 
that it is mainly the US that has supported and insisted on the validity of the 
persistent objector doctrine in this context and that this decision has not 
been confirmed by any other regional or international court since 2002.54 
4.2  The application of the persistent objector doctrine in the domain 
of human rights law 
The persistent objector doctrine has received extensive critique in terms of 
its application as a general defence to a customary international law norm. 
In summation, this critique has been based on the following grounds: (i) the 
lack of actual state practice supporting it; (ii) its logical incoherence and its 
inconsistent application; and (iii) the fundamental challenge it represents to 
the concept of customary international law.55 Even though these issues are 
underlying factors in any critique of the persistent objector doctrine, this part 
will essentially focus on the critique levelled against the application of the 
persistent objector doctrine specifically within the domain of international 
human rights law. It is worth noting, however, as a point of departure, that 
"no tribunal has ever ruled that the status of persistent objector prevented 
the application of a norm of customary law to the objecting State" and as 
such it can be concluded that even though it is utilised by states it is still a 
fictive defence.56 
                                            
51  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 500. 
52  Michael Domingues v United States Case 12.285 Rep 62/02 IACom, Doc 5 rev 1 913 
(2002). 
53  It is questionable whether this particular norm has obtained the status of jus cogens, 
but as this particular issue is of no further assistance to the main argument it will not 
be further pursued. 
54  Dumberry 2010 ICLQ 779-780. 
55  Dumberry 2010 ICLQ 784. 
56  Dumberry 2010 ICLQ 802.  
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Not much work has been done on the use of the persistent objector doctrine 
within the scope of human rights law. Below, this article explores Lau's main 
theory. His theory is constructed around three basic questions: (i) whether 
a state may opt out of an emerging human rights norm by objecting to it 
during the ripening phase of customary international law; (ii) what role the 
universality of human rights law plays in this regard; and (iii) whether there 
should be a complete bar against the persistent objector doctrine under 
human rights law? 
In Lau's analysis of the persistent objector doctrine and its application to 
human rights law he focusses on two important aspects of customary 
international law, namely state consent and a state's ability to foresee its 
liabilities under international law. To this, he adds the universal nature of 
international human rights law as an underlying factor relating to how states 
conceptualise or should conceptualise the persistent objector doctrine in 
this particular context. 
Regarding the role of the persistent objector doctrine in preserving state 
dissent, there are several examples that lead to the conclusion that consent 
in modern international law plays a diminishing role. The emergence of 
universal jurisdiction over certain crimes, the fact that the consent of the 
new states created after the period of de-colonialisation was not sought in 
terms of the already existing international standards and the growing 
support for different types of interventions in the sovereign affairs of states 
all point in this direction.57 
Arguing as a positivist and demonstrating the existence of universal human 
rights by noting the acceptance and ratification of human rights instruments 
by a vast majority of states regardless of their cultural background, the most 
important contribution of Lau58 is the notion of what he refers to as "original 
consent". As said under 3 above, the main assumption supporting the 
international human rights law regime is the notion of universality, and as 
suggested by Lau: 
The UDHR and the Vienna Declaration embody states' informal consent to the 
inextricable universality of human rights law. Participation in the UN human 
rights regime - which grew out of the UDHR - should itself be considered an 
informal expression of consent to the regime's underlying assumption of 
universalism.59 
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This idea fits well with the argument presented under 3 above, that the core 
value of the UDHR is not primarily the rights but its "universal" application. 
As such, it must be accepted that as at least part of the rights set out in the 
UDHR (as further argued above under 3) have become firmly established 
as customary international law, the basic principle in terms of which they 
exist must at the very minimum be afforded the same status. Tied in with 
the idea of original consent, this would yield the result that "if a state 
participates in the UN human rights regime but later requests to excuse itself 
from a specific human rights [norm] because of its objections during the 
specific law's emergence, that request should be refused".60 Principles of 
consent are not violated, because the state had already consented to the 
universal application of all human rights to all human beings. 
Regardless of whether the universality of human rights is viewed from the 
position of "original consent", as expressed by Lau, or as an unequivocal 
precondition to any or all human rights, as suggested under 3, the end result 
is the same. The idea that the universality of human rights is a precondition 
to the human rights regime is a sine qua non without which this field of law 
could arguably not exist. Any state that seriously argues against this point 
would not only violate the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations61 but would also, in repudiating its support for this pre-condition, 
have to distance itself from the entire human rights law regime. It is worrying 
but evident from the discussion under 5 below that such threats are being 
made. 
The second function of the persistent objector doctrine is that it gives states 
the opportunity to predict their legal obligations under customary 
international law. As mentioned above, customary international law 
develops over time, sometimes in an imprecise fashion. This arguably 
makes it hard for states to ascertain when customary international law has 
ripened; that is, when states must start complying with the norm. However, 
this purpose is rapidly becoming less and less significant, as international 
human rights litigation is becoming more and more frequent.62 Arguably, 
where the position of customary international law is disputed, international 
case law, such as judgments from the ICJ or the regional human rights 
courts (the IACtHR, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and African 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR), as referred to under 4.3) 
can act as a subsidiary source of international law, as referred to in article 
                                            
60  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 503. 
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62  Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 506. 
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38(d) of the Statute of the ICJ. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge 
that these bodies are consent-based: that is, states subject themselves to 
the jurisdiction of these courts. As concluded by Lau63, "[a]s far as the 
human rights context is concerned, the doctrine should be limited to cases 
in which foreseeability is truly at issue … [t]hat is to say, the doctrine should 
only be honoured if there is not definitive and applicable case law regarding 
the human rights norm at issue". 
4.3  The foreseeability of state obligations related to SOGI rights 
As foreseeability is a key function of the persistent objector doctrine, it is of 
interest to further explore what state obligations have already been defined 
by key human rights forums. Within the context of the UN Universal Periodic 
Review, more than one hundred states from all regions of the world have 
made voluntary commitments to address SOGI-based violence and 
discrimination.64 Furthermore, the broad-based acceptance of SOGI rights 
by the main UN treaty bodies is undisputed.65 To exemplify this, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) accepted sexual orientation and sexual identity as 
prohibited grounds in Toonen v Australia,66 and the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General 
Comment No. 20 defined "[o]ther status" in article 2(2) of the ICESCR as 
including sexual orientation. As such, state parties to the ICESCR should: 
[E]nsure that a person's sexual orientation is not a barrier to realizing 
Covenant rights, for example, in accessing survivor's pension rights. In 
addition, gender identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination; for example, persons who are transgender, transsexual or 
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intersex often face serious human rights violations, such as harassment in 
schools or in the workplace.67 
The approach of the existing regional systems indicates that there is equal 
evidence that SOGI forms part of the basic prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, supporting the idea that SOGI rights are indeed universal in 
application. The IACtHR confirmed the universality of SOGI rights in Karen 
Atala and Daughters v Chile68 and later in its 2017 Advisory Opinion on 
gender identity and expression69 (Advisory Opinion). In the Advisory 
Opinion, the IACtHR confirmed that member states of the American 
Convention on Human Rights70 have an obligation to permit transgender 
individuals to change their names and genders on identity documents, to 
recognise same-sex marriage, and to ensure the economic rights of those 
in same-sex relationships. The IACtHR concluded that state recognition of 
a person's gender identity is a vital component of guaranteeing transgender 
individuals access to the full enjoyment of their human rights.71 In the 
Advisory Opinion, the IACtHR importantly established that it defines gender 
identity as an internal and individual experience of gender that may not align 
with the sex assigned at birth.72 It confirmed that article 1.1 (the right to non-
discrimination) of the IACom prohibits discrimination based on a person's 
gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.73  The 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR is even more comprehensive.74 It has over time 
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moved from applying the right to privacy in Dungeon v UK75 and a number 
of subsequent cases76 to striking down anti-sodomy laws in Europe and 
onto the judgment in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal,77 where the 
ECtHR argued that sexual orientation was a distinction prohibited by article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It has 
furthermore dealt with SOGI rights "in the context of the age of consent, 
freedom of assembly, expression and association, adoption, parental rights 
and obligations, housing tenure, social and employer benefits, military 
service, residence permits and extradition, gender reassignment, dress 
code, blood donation, registration of partnerships, personal refusal of 
service to lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans persons, and violence and the 
lack of investigation thereof".78 
Under the last of the three regional human rights systems, the African 
system, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (AComHR), 
has at least partially accepted the SOGI concept and its universal 
application. In Resolution 275 on Protection against Violence and other 
Human Rights Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or 
imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity79 the AcomHR, in referring 
to the rights of "all individuals", strongly urges states to: 
[E]nd all acts of violence and abuse, whether committed by State or non-state 
actors, including by enacting and effectively applying appropriate laws 
                                            
(2010) ECHR 1053; Norris v Ireland (App No 10581/83) (1988) 13 EHRR 186; PB and 
JS v Austria (App No 18984/02) (2012) 55 EHRR 31; Popov v France (App 39470/07) 
(2012) ECHR 2070; Rees v UK (App No 9532/81) (1986) 9 EHRR 56; S v UK (App 
11716/85) 47 DR 274; Salguiero Da Silva Mouta v Portugal (App No 33290/96) (2001) 
31 EHRR 47; Schalk and Kopf v Austria (App No 30141/04) (2011) 53 EHRR 20; 
Sheffield and Horsham v the United Kingdom (App No 23390/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 
163; Smith and Grady v The United Kingdom (App Nos 33985/96 and 33986/96) 
(1999) 29 EHRR 493; Tyrer v UK (App No 5856/72) (25 April 1978) 2 EHRR 1 xxi; 
Vallianatos v Greece (App Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09) (2014) 59 EHRR 12; WB v 
Federal Republic of Germany (App No 104/55) (1955); X v Austria (App No 19010/07) 
(2013) ECHR 425; X and Y v UK (App No 9368/81) 32 DR 220; X, Y and Z v The 
United Kingdom (App No 21830/93) (1997) 24 EHRR 1071; and Yousef v The 
Netherlands (App No 33711/96) (2002) ECHR 716. 
75  Dudgeon v United Kingdom ECHR (23 September 1981) Ser A 45. 
76  Norris v Ireland ECHR (26 October 1988) Ser A 142; Modinos v Cyprus ECHR (22 
April 1993) Ser A 259; Lustig-Preen and Beckett v UK (2000) 29 ECHR 548. 
77  Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal ECHR (21 March 2010) Ser A 741. 
78  Rudman 2015 AHRLJ 6. See also ECHR 2018 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Sexual_orientation_ENG.pdf; ECHR 2013 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Homo sexuality_ENG.pdf; ECHR 2013 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_ identity_ENG.pdf. 
79  Protection against Violence and other Human Rights Violations against Persons on 
the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity Adopted at 
the 55th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
in Luanda, Angola (28 April-12 May 2014) (hereafter Resolution 275). 
A RUDMAN  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  19 
prohibiting and punishing all forms of violence including those targeting 
persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender 
identities, ensuring proper investigation and diligent prosecution of 
perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures responsive to the needs of 
victims.80 
This approach to SOGI rights has further been confirmed by the AComHR 
in its joint dialogue with the IACom on Human Rights and the UN under the 
theme of Ending violence and other human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.81 In this regard it is essential to note that the 
AComHR, in performing both a protective and a promotional mandate under 
article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), 
refers in Resolution 275 to article 2 (non-discrimination), article 3 (the equal 
application of the law), article 4 (respect of their life and the integrity of the 
person) and article 5 (the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment) in promoting the universal application 
of the ACHPR. The AComHR has also in two decisions on individual 
complaints82 (albeit obiter) and a number of concluding observations83 
referred to sexual orientation as a prohibited ground. It further confirmed 
this position in its General Comments on article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa, where the AComHR stated that "there are multiple 
forms of discrimination based on various grounds such as: race, sex, 
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sexuality, [and] sexual orientation".84 A similar position was suggested in its 
General Comment No 4, where the AcomHR indicated that it uses a non-
exhaustive list of grounds of discrimination, which includes SOGI.85 
The jurisprudence and decisions of the regional judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies as well as the persuasive statements of all the major UN treaty 
bodies amount to a clear sign that SOGI rights are grounded in the universal 
application of human rights. Therefore, if universality is the point of 
departure for the protection of all human rights, SOGI rights included, and 
the concept of universality forms part of customary international law and as 
such cannot be re-negotiated to embrace only certain human beings and 
certain rights, where does that leave the persistent objector doctrine? This 
question is explored in more detail below. 
5 The African voice at the UNHRC 
This part aims to analyse the statements of the seven86 African states that 
made submissions during the voting procedure before the UNHRC in 
relation to Resolution 32/2. The objective of this section is to highlight the 
misconception of the universality argument as set out under 3, the cultural 
relativist approaches that feed into this misconception, and the use of the 
persistent objector doctrine as set out under 4, in this context. 
It is important to point out that the statements analysed below do not reflect 
the full spectrum of the relevant states' policy, neither on human rights law 
in general nor specifically regarding SOGI rights. Nevertheless, the 
submissions related to below shed some light on the varying positions of 
these states on SOGI rights and on the very practical way in which the 
persistent objector doctrine is engaged. 
5.1  Establishing an Independent Expert on SOGI rights 
As mentioned in the introduction, the main objectives of Resolution 32/2 are 
to reaffirm that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights 
and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
UDHR. Flowing from this objective it also aims to confirm that acts of 
violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against 
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individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity are 
deplorable; and to appoint, for a period of three years, an Independent 
Expert on SOGI rights. The main mandate of the Independent Expert on 
SOGI rights is to assess the implementation of existing international human 
rights treaties in order to find ways to overcome violence and discrimination 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer persons, 
while identifying both best practices and gaps. 
Resolution 32/2 was presented against the background of the previous 
resolutions on human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity adopted 
by the UNHRC in 201187 and 2014.88 Resolution 32/2 was brought to the 
UNHRC by seven states, all from Latin America.89 Mexico, the only member 
with a seat at the UNHRC in 2016, led the arguments in favour of the 
resolution. Forty-two states originally sponsored Resolution 32/2; however, 
the only African state sponsoring the resolution, Angola, withdrew shortly 
before the proceedings commenced.90 
5.2  Nigeria, Morocco and Algeria – persistent objectors? 
Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria have previously objected to SOGI protection 
at the UNHRC, Nigeria by opposing Resolution 17/19 and Algeria and 
Morocco by opposing Resolution 27/32.91 It is evident from the statements 
made by the representatives of these three delegations that they saw this 
as an opportunity to apply the persistent objector doctrine and further to 
refute any argument that customary international law has ripened in this 
regard. These states based their arguments squarely on an interpretation of 
universality to mean unanimity in state actions, and on accusations of 
revisionism. As a starting point it is notable that all three delegations referred 
to their full commitment to end violence and discrimination in all its forms – 
pinpointing their commitment to the universal application of human rights 
law to all.92 
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In terms of invoking the persistent objector doctrine, the representative of 
the Nigerian delegation clearly objected, not only with its no-vote, but also 
by stating that, "[m]y government … seriously object[s] to LGBT rights as 
human rights and have legislated against those rights".93 Many references 
were also made to the non-consent to SOGI rights and the lack of universal 
acceptance of the SOGI concept. The representative of the Algerian 
delegation submitted that his government did not find it useful to "impose 
values that [were] not agreed upon universally on others"94 while the 
Moroccan delegation questioned the universality and remarked that "[s]o, 
we are talking about the universality, when the common ground between 
human civilizations is achieved, whereas today we are facing a draft 
resolution that is against the values and the beliefs of at least 1.5 billion that 
belong to one civilization".95 The Nigerian delegation furthermore noted that 
"this resolution will not serve any useful purpose for the vast majority of 
States that don't believe in it".96 
It is evident from the statements quoted above that the battle over SOGI 
rights centres on the "correct" definition of "universal", which in itself is 
deeply ironic. In terms of drawing on the UDHR and in refuting what Lau 
refers to as the "original consent" or what this article has defined above as 
an "unequivocal precondition" to human rights law, the Nigerian 
representative referred to the introduction of Resolution 32/2 as 
representing: 
[a] clear departure from the combined wisdom of the Declaration of Human 
Rights and call[ed] into question the legality of such an action under the guise 
of protection of gays and lesbians. Mr. President, allow me to remind this 
august body that this issue has not been recognized by the vast majority of 
legal systems as part of the international human rights structure, and that it 
has not received sanction by any legal framework, outside the acceptance of 
its existence in special privilege accorded under national law in some States. 
Due diligence must accrue to look at legislations in our attempts to form 
concepts and give them global legality.97 
This statement also brings to the fore the opinion that SOGI rights are not 
part of international human rights law, which opinion is in sharp contrast to 
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the judgments, decisions and statements presented under 4.3 above. 
Furthermore, when they demonstrated their opposition to Resolution 32/2, 
it is evident that the proponents for the no-vote were also prepared to link 
the disregard for the universality of human rights law to the fundamental 
structures not only of the UNHRC but also the broader international 
community. As an example, in the statement by the representative of the 
Moroccan delegation the vote on Resolution 32/2 was referred to as "a very 
dangerous turning point" and the "beginning of a very dark period in the life 
of the Council where two-thirds of humanity and humankind will feel that 
they are outside the Council",98 whereas the Nigerian representative 
referred to the vote as polarising.99 
5.3  Ghana, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana – accepting the 
development of SOGI rights under customary international law? 
While the Nigerian, Moroccan and Algerian statements are interesting from 
the perspective of invoking the persistent objector doctrine, using 
universality and consent as primary arguments, the positions of Ghana, 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa all present interesting shifts, in one 
way or another, from the positions these states previously held. 
Ghana represents perhaps the most interesting shift. It not only moved from 
a no-vote in terms of Resolution 17/19 in 2011 to abstaining in 2016, but 
also clearly acknowledged the development in regional law taking place in 
this timespan as a major factor contributing to its more positive position on 
SOGI rights. In his statement, before the final vote on Resolution 32/2, the 
Ghanaian representative referred to Resolution 275 and took cognisance of 
the fact that the resolution had been concluded against the background of 
what the AComHR found to be an alarming incidence of acts of violence, 
discrimination and other human rights violations that continue to be 
committed against individuals in many parts of Africa because of their actual 
or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity. In recognising the 
development in SOGI protection, the Ghanaian representative made the 
following statement, succinctly highlighting the tension between the 
development of customary international law and the domestic position: 
[W]e are meeting at this time against the backdrop of what happened in 
Orlando. Ghana's Constitution prohibits discrimination of all kinds, and 
therefore the resolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
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Rights is in conformity with our Constitution. The laws of Ghana will not permit 
any individual to be persecuted or assaulted because of their sexual 
orientation … But Mr. President, this is a very sensitive matter culturally in 
Ghana.100 
In highlighting the gradual change in Ghana's position, the representative 
gave the following explanation: 
[I]n 2011 Ghana voted against the resolution that has been referred to in the 
preambular paragraphs. But there has been evolution of thinking, partly 
because of the Orlando situation, and also because of the resolution of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.101 
Clearly not prepared to outright contradict what is believed to be the 
sentiments of the Ghanaian people, which presumably gave rise to the 
characterisation of the issue as "a very sensitive matter culturally", but 
cognisant of the development of regional human rights law, Ghana chose 
not to invoke the persistent objector doctrine. Instead, it referred to an 
"evolution in thinking" which could be viewed as an indication of its 
perception of the development of customary international law in this regard. 
The South African position represents a step in a different direction, 
although it also abstained from voting in the final round. Importantly, South 
Africa, as the main sponsor, directed the UNHRC to adopt Resolution 17/19, 
the first SOGI resolution in the history of the UNHRC. Equally, in 2012, in 
response to a motion from the United Arab Emirates to remove the terms 
"sexual orientation and gender identity" from the General Assembly 
Resolution on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,102 South 
Africa voted for retaining the SOGI reference.103 Finally, in 2014, when the 
UNHRC adopted Resolution 17/32, South Africa was the only African state 
to vote for the resolution and consequently against the seven hostile 
amendments that preceded the final vote.104 
Against this background it is interesting to analyse the 2016 response from 
the South African delegation to Resolution 32/2. From its previous actions 
and statements it was quite clear that it had accepted and in fact 
spearheaded the development of customary international law in this regard. 
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This position overall was built on the domestic legal position where 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited.105 For this reason 
the statement made by South Africa that "while [it] supported those parts of 
this resolution which focus primarily on ending violence and discrimination 
against LGBTI persons, [it] cannot support this resolution as it stands and 
will therefore abstain" raised serious concerns about its SOGI 
commitments.106 The reasons provided had nothing to do, it seems, with its 
legal obligations or its policy position in this regard, but rather with the 
manner in which the sponsors approached the resolution. This is clearly 
reflected in the statements of the South African representative to the effect 
that "[g]randstanding, recklessness, brinkmanship and point-scoring will not 
take us anywhere" and "[h]ow the current sponsors have sought to build on 
the South African initiative of 2011, has added divisive dimensions and 
created unnecessary acrimony in this Council".107 
Although it is not possible to confirm definitively why South Africa left the 
core group sponsoring the previous SOGI resolutions, Voss108 suggests that 
domestic politics and regional pressure contributed the most to South 
Africa's decision to shift positions on SOGI. The South African approach is 
an interesting example as South Africa seems to be in complete agreement 
with the point of introducing this resolution and the fact that customary 
international law is developing towards consistent SOGI protection. It 
recognises its domestic obligation towards upholding SOGI rights, as 
reiterated in the statements before the UNHRC with reference to the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution). South Africa also confirms the position of the AComHR, that 
"no persons should be subjected to discrimination and violence on any 
ground including on the basis of sexual orientation".109 From this 
perspective, it is difficult to understand its opposition to a resolution that 
carries exactly the same message. 
The final two examples refer to the positions of Namibia and Botswana. Both 
states made submissions in the final stages of the procedures before the 
UNHRC. Botswana had earlier rejected Resolution 17/32, whereas Namibia 
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had abstained. As with the statements discussed above, both submissions 
reiterated that the states did not condone violence or discrimination against 
any person.110 However, even though both states confirmed this protection 
in their respective constitutions, they referred to the current development of 
customary international law and the lack, in their opinion, of the 
crystallisation of the law in this regard. The representative from Botswana 
indicated this by stating that "at international level and within international 
law there is no agreed definition or acceptance of the use of the terminology 
on sexual orientation and gender identity … [i]t is in fact a concept that is 
still developing, even at international levels".111 In the same vein the 
representative of the Namibian delegation referred to the "fact that there is 
no binding international instrument guiding us in the field of international 
human rights law which provides us with an agreed definition of sexual 
orientation and gender identity". This, she stated, "poses a legal lacuna for 
us".112 It is interesting to note that these delegations did not object to the 
norm per se but questioned the maturity of customary international law with 
reference to domestic cultural and religious practices. 
6  Conclusion 
From the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and ECtHR it is evident that SOGI 
rights have been read into the IAC and the ECHR through the non-
discrimination clauses giving effect to SOGI rights on the American and 
European continents. This interpretation of discrimination based on SOGI, 
mirrored by the main UN Treaty Bodies, has been established by the courts 
through a purposeful interpretation of the relevant provisions on the one 
hand and by their analysis of regional state practice on the other. In relation 
to the latter, the main objective of this article was to establish if SOGI rights, 
once confirmed as part of customary international law, would be susceptible 
to any unilateral defence against such a norm. As has been highlighted 
throughout this article, customary international law is currently developing 
and therefore it is now that the persistent objector doctrine can be invoked 
and also evaluated. Based on the three tenets of (i) universality (in 
application and negating the need for consent); (ii) existing case law; and 
(iii) the favourable outcome in the three SOGI resolutions presented before 
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the UNHRC since 2011, this article concludes that neither consent nor 
foreseeability will justify the use of the persistent objector doctrine defence 
in the domain of SOGI rights once customary international law has matured. 
The arguments based on the main functionalities of the persistent objector 
doctrine, to uphold consent and create foreseeability, find little or no 
reasonable, general application within international human rights law, due 
to the very nature of the law and the increasing availability of relevant 
jurisprudence. On the point of the nature of the law, the universality of all 
human rights fundamentally contradicts the persistent objector doctrine 
defence as used by Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco. As suggested in this 
article the reference to an "unequivocal pre-condition" based on customary 
international law and jus cogens instead of "original consent" would better 
frame the universality of human rights as separate from state consent, as 
the reference to consent, even captured as "original", gives a false notion of 
optionality. 
On the point of foreseeability, in his final analysis113 Lau suggests that the 
acceptance of the persistent objector doctrine should be limited to cases 
where foreseeability is strictly an issue. In other words, in cases where the 
customary international law norm is maturing, but where the contents of the 
norm or its application is so unclear that once it binds all, it is reasonable for 
a court to accept that a state could not possibly have foreseen the actual 
outcome of the customary international law norm. It is evident from the 
discussion under 4.3 that such an argument would not find application with 
regard to SOGI rights. 
The statements made at the UNHRC by Nigeria, Morocco and Algeria are 
clear examples of persistent objections. However, while it will in future be 
possible for these states to find proof of their objections and the persistent 
nature thereof in support of a defence against SOGI rights based on the 
persistent objector doctrine, such a defence should be rejected. Importantly, 
state practice on SOGI rights on the African continent is not uniform in its 
rejection of SOGI rights. On the contrary, states such as Ghana, Namibia 
and Botswana exemplify an important change of direction. 
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